We examine the impact of agreements that prohibit "superstars" from switching their services to rivals on …rms'ability to collude. Exclusivity (or non-compete) clauses are not uncommon in the sports, entertainment and professional services industries, but courts often refrain from enforcing them owing to inequity and/or restraint of trade considerations. We argue this attitude may be misguided. While in the collusive path exclusion may be inconsequential because …rms agree not to hire each other's star, its enforcement level a¤ects the severity of future punishments. For exclusive talent may not be poached by rivals. The ability to sustain tacit collusion may thus be impaired, which in plausible constellations leads to e¢ ciency improvements and more equitable distribution of rents.
Introduction
Talent is a precious commodity in constant scarce supply. This makes it very expensive. When …rms scramble for premium talent in the market (a "star"), they may hold a tight grip on hiring costs by writing exclusivity clauses that prohibit potential stars from dealing with others in the future. That way, the star's outside opportunities plummet. Alternatively …rms may sustain tacit understandings whereby they do not try to hire each other's star, thus eschewing "star wars" that consume the rents created by new talent.
While both mechanisms are observed in practice, the economics literature contains no formal analysis of the (see, e.g., Lafontaine and Slade (2005) ), or courts may feel that stipulated damages depart too much from "reasonable" payments, thus dismissing them as inadequate or punitive and refusing to enforce them-see, e.g., Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and the literature cited there. Relatedly, if the productive interaction between …rm and star extends over many periods, one could interpret the probability that exclusivity is enforced as the maximum duration of the exclusivity provision that courts are prepared to enforce. We simply note that any of these interpretations is well-suited to our theoretical framework.
The main thrust of the connection between exclusive rights over stars and collusion in the market for talent is the following. Exclusive employment agreements and coordination between …rms that compete for talent are substitute methods of appropriating revenues generated by the stars. In e¤ect both ensure that wage packets remain relatively low. In the presence of collusive behavior in the market for new talent, exclusivity is often immaterial because …rms agree not to hire each other's stars. During a punishment phase in which there is increased competition for talent, however, exclusivity is valuable because it prevents rivals from poaching stars. On such occasions, exclusivity is much more instrumental in rent seeking. Hence when courts are more likely to upheld exclusivity clauses, the gains from deviating (the pro…t from luring the star away from the rival) are large relative to the punishment for deviating (the loss of future pro…ts owing to …erce competition). Ceteris paribus, collusive outcomes are thus harder to maintain.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we analyze repeated interaction between …rms when stars are homogeneous. This enables us to study in a simple setting how the level of enforcement of exclusive contracts between …rms and (potential) stars impinges on …rms' ability to sustain collusive outcomes. The main result is that if courts are more prone to enforce exclusive contracts, it is harder for …rms to cooperate and avoid …erce competition for free talent. Thus stars actually earn higher equilibrium rewards when exclusivity is more likely to be enforced. The underlying intuition has been provided above.
We also show that tighter enforcement of exclusive contracts may also be e¢ ciency-enhancing. Based on the concept of multimarket contact pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) , we argue than when …rms arguably interact in many markets simultaneously, breaking down collusion in the market for talent may induce competitive behavior in all markets.
In Section 3, we consider a richer model comprising stars and …rms with di¤erent productivity. This allows us to study how …rms'incentives to write exclusive contracts vary across talent, and to examine wealth redistributions across stars as a result of changes in the likelihood of enforcement. With heterogeneity, …rms' ability to collude depends on realised talent. Speci…cally, the more talented a free star is, the harder it is to sustain non-competitive behavior because the temptation to cheat goes up. On such occasions, colluding …rms increase the salary packet o¤ered to the star in order to reduce the gains from deviating. Hence uniquely talented stars who are free in the market earn premium wages. Since cooperation never really breaks down, these outcomes are a sort of "cold wars" for talent. Our model also implies that …rms …nd exclusivity valuable even along the collusive phase, and that its value is sensitive to the star's talent-in equilibrium, only superstars are bounded by exclusive contracts. E¤ectively, for less outstanding stars the coordination wage is low even when they are free in the market, so there are no gains from writing exclusive contracts with them.
In this context, increasing the probabilistic enforcement of exclusive contracts has two opposite e¤ects on stars'payo¤s. On the one hand, stars lose because they are free less often; on the other hand, when they are free their wages may go up because coordination is harder to sustain-this is a novel e¤ect that this paper emphasizes. The interplay between these two forces ultimately determines whether principals and stars lose or gain from shifts in enforcement level. We show that for stars of exceptional talent the …rst e¤ect tends to dominate, whereas for stars of moderate talent the second e¤ect is the dominant. Thus, when enforcement increases there is redistribution of surplus from very talented stars to less talented ones. One can also show that principals can be worse o¤ following an increase in exclusivity enforcement. Another implication of our analysis is that exclusive agreements are rampant precisely when courts are more likely to enforce them.
While this result seems intuitive, the underlying mechanism at work is subtle. Exclusive contracts are more frequently used not because they are necessarily more e¤ective, but because collusive outcomes are harder to sustain and principals fall back on other ways to appropriate the rents created by their stars.
In Section 4, we make some concluding remarks.
Basic Model
Consider a market with two identical, in…nitely lived principals, P 1 and P 2 . At the beginning of the period, each principal hires an agent from a large pool of homogenous individuals. Agents are embedded with star potential, and those hired in a given period are equally likely to become the single star in the market. 5 To capture repeated competition between principals for new talent, we assume agents/stars live for only one period. (The pool of agents is replaced every new period.) Thus, talent is constantly in scarce supply. Both principals and agents are risk neutral and maximize expected wealth.
The supergame we study in this paper consists of a discounted, in…nitely repeated stage game in which each principal "breeds"the star in the market with probability 0.5. (Throughout we use masculine pronouns for the principals and feminine pronouns for the agents and stars.) Time is discrete (indexed by ) and denotes the common discount factor between stages, with 0 < < 1. The precise timing of events within 5 For simplicity, we assume that each period only one of the agents becomes a star. We do not formally model the mechanism by which agents develop into real stars. The important feature in our approach is that only those hired by principals may develop their star potential, which emphasizes the role played by employers in the star-breeding process. Think of principals as football clubs or music labels that spot raw talent, whereas agents could be amateur young players or musicians who need to further their natural talent and to be trained/promoted/groomed to become superstars.
each period-or constituent game-is as follows.
1. Contracting phase. At the outset principals meet agents and make take-it-or-leave-it employment contract o¤ers. (Agents cannot simultaneously work for both principals.) With this assumption we want to capture the idea that there is, ex ante, a competitive supply of potential stars. P i 's o¤er takes the form i = (w i ; i ) ; i 2 f1; 2g, where w i denotes the agent's binding salary and i 2 fnon-exclusive, exclusiveg represents absence or presence of an exclusionary clause that forbids employment with other principals during the period. If P i 's o¤er is rejected the matched agent irretrievably returns to the pool of unmatched individuals-she has zero probability of being resampled-whilst the principal draws a new agent, and this process continues until both principals hired their respective agents. 6 We posit that up-front transfers from agents to principals are infeasible because the former are wealth-constrained and protected by limited liability. 7 2. Contract enforcement and competition for talent. Once all parties observed the contracts signed in the market, the state of nature is revealed and the identity of the star becomes public knowledge.
If the employment contract of the new star includes an exclusionary clause, she may try to get around the exclusivity provision by legally "repudiating" the contract. In that connection, e 2 [0; 1] stands for the probability that exclusive-dealing arrangements will be enforced by the enforcement agencyi.e. courts of law. 8 We assume e is exogenous and …xed as it depends, by and large, on the legal environment.
If the star is tied to her principal by an enforceable exclusivity clause, she may stay and earn the contracted wage or quit and get her outside wage (or reservation utility) w 0 0. 9 If the new star in the market is non-exclusive (either because her employment contract does not embody an exclusivity provision or because courts decided not to enforce it), she is "free talent"and may be poached by other principals. At this point, principals may engage in …erce competition for the free star in the market or tacitly agree not to hire each other's star so as to eschew bidding wars for free talent. It is the ability to collude at this particular stage that lies at the centre of our analysis.
3. Production. At the end of each period production takes place. The star generates (gross) revenues to her employer whereas an ordinary agent generates w 0 , where > w 0 : As stated above, w 0 also 6 The assumption that principals hold all the bargaining power at the contracting stage simpli…es the analysis considerably but is not crucial for our results. This is formally shown in the Appendix. 7 This implies that two-part tari¤ o¤ers are also ruled out. We think our assumption is natural and realistic in the context of this paper, since more often than not it is virtually impossible to borrow money in the market against unveri…able talent
potential. Yet in Section 2.2 we brie ‡y examine the main implications of relaxing this assumption. 8 Alternatively but equivalently, think of e as the maximum level of exclusionary rights that courts are able/willing to enforce.
In this interpretation e represents the maximum level of exclusivity allowed in this market. 9 Exclusive stars may not be poached by other employers.
represents the reservation utility/wage or outside opportunity of an ordinary agent. Thus principals are indi¤erent between remaining inactive in a given period and employing an ordinary agent because in both cases they collect zero. 10 Throughout we con…ne ourselves to "collusive" equilibrium outcomes that permit principals to appropriate the revenues created by stars, assuming that in the subgame following a defection there is in…nite reversion to the (static) Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Our focus on (stationary) trigger strategies entails no loss of generality because, as it will become clear shortly, this strategy pro…le also characterizes an optimal punishment (see Abreu, 1988 ). 
Exclusivity Enforcement and Collusion
This section discusses the key forces at work in our analysis within a simpli…ed setting of repeated interaction between …rms in the market for new talent. Concretely, we illustrate how the (probabilistic) level of enforcement of exclusive employment contracts a¤ects the critical discount factor above which …rms can sustain collusive outcomes.
One-Shot Game. We begin by examining the (static) equilibrium of the one-shot game. Since in this milieu collusion is unfeasible, its associated payo¤s represent what principals expect to collect in each period of the punishment phase. Without loss of generality, suppose P 1 's agent is the new star in the market.
Suppose also that the contract between P 1 and his agent is 1 = (w 1 ; exclusive), where w 0 w 1 < . 12 If exclusivity is enforced, the principals'payo¤s are given by
When the exclusivity deal is enforced, the star's equilibrium reward equals w 1 . Since the other principal can be excluded, the contract with the star simply needs to guarantee she can make at least her outside option from quitting. 13 Hence P 1 keeps the star and reaps w 1 whereas P 2 employs an ordinary agent 1 0 We denote by w 0 the revenue generated by an ordinary agent to simplify notation. Throughout most of the paper, we assume that owing to convention or legal restrictions the agent may not be paid less than w 0 : So think of w 0 as a legally enforceable minimum wage. 1 1 Trigger strategies, or Nash reversions, refer to strategies that punish deviations from the (tacit) collusive outcome by reverting to the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever. Thus, they are subgame perfect and entail an eternal punishment phase: it lasts for all remaining periods of the game. 1 2 It is also without loss of generality to consider a contracted wage w < , since is the maximum payo¤ (gross of wage payments) that a principal can obtain. 1 3 This is a simplifying assumption. In the Appendix A.2 we show that the main conclusion of this section also obtains when the star has some bargaining power and can induce a wage renegotiation ex post.
and collects zero. This outcome must be compared with the alternative situation in which the star is "free talent" in the market. On such occasions, we posit that principals scramble for the new talent by making simultaneous wage o¤ers to the star. As is well known, in the unique solution of this Bertrand-type (auction)
game principals bid away all the revenues created by the star. 14 As a result, the star's equilibrium reward equals and the principals'payo¤s come down to
Expressions (2.1) and (2.3) imply that principals will optimally write exclusivity deals during the punishment phase. (This holds, of course, so long as the cost of writing exclusive contracts is not "too large".) Since the principals'payo¤ are decreasing in w i , the equilibrium of the constituent game has i = (w 0 ; exclusive) for i 2 f1; 2g. Therefore the principals' expected payo¤s when, say, P 1 's agent becomes the star are as follows:
E¤ectively, when exclusivity is enforced by courts P 1 and P 2 collect w 0 and zero, respectively, whereas the star gets w 0 . This case occurs with probability e. In the presence of free talent, however, principals compete …ercely and the star goes to whoever pays the highest wage. As a result, the star's equilibrium reward escalates to and both principals get zero. This case occurs with the complementary probability 1 e: So long as e > 0 and the cost of writing exclusivity deals is relatively low (e.g., negligible transaction costs), principals always sign exclusive contracts with their agents in the punishment phase and expect to reap positive gains.
In…nitely Repeated Game. We now consider the supergame in which principals tacitly agree not to compete for the new star in the market. To be more precise, collusive behavior by principals means that P i abstains from making a (secret and binding) wage o¤er to a star who was initially hired by P i . In this way principals avert bidding away the rents created by free talent. Importantly, we posit that no side payments between principals are allowed owing to antitrust legislation. So irrespective of whether the star is exclusive or not, with coordination is always captured by the principal who initially contracted with the star.
A non-competitive (or cooperative) equilibrium outcome may be characterized as a path of contract o¤ers and associated payo¤s i ( ) ;
; i = f1; 2g ; where it is understood that deviations from this path are punished by retreating to the static solution forever. 15 Since this equilibrium entails an implicit 1 4 The wage o¤ers made by principals to the star might be secret. 1 5 To be fully rigorous, this characterization of a non-competitive equilibrium outcome should also include the principals'wage o¤ers to a free star in the market. Since these o¤ers are not made along a collusive equilibrium path, we omit this variable to reduce notational burden.
understanding proscribing principals from hiring each other's stars, the most pro…table outcome exhibits contracted wages equal to w 0 . 16 The payo¤ stream from the collusive path is thus given by
In e¤ect principals split 50:50 the bene…ts from collusion because both are equally likely to groom agents for star. Notice that exclusivity is in fact immaterial for principals' payo¤s when collusive outcomes are sustainable. Hence exclusivity and collusion are to some extent substitute methods of appropriating the rents created by new stars. As we shall see, however, the probability of enforcement of exclusive contracts, e; impinges on principals'ability to maintain non-competitive behavior.
To investigate the linkage between exclusivity and collusive outcomes, suppose P i deviates from the tacit agreement by (secretly) o¤ering w 0 + " to P i 's star when she is free, for an arbitrarily small ": Since the star accepts P i 's binding o¤er, the most a principal can gain from cheating on the collusive arrangement is
Principals anticipate that any deviation from the (equilibrium) collusive path at time x will be punished by a reversion to the Bertrand-type (static) solution forever, i.e., from x + 1 on. Therefore if the expected value of such punishments are large enough to outweigh the immediate gains from cheating, the collusive outcome is sustainable. From (2.4) through (2.6), the expected discounted loss of future pro…ts equals
) is positive and decreasing in e. While heightened contract enforcement leaves the payo¤ stream from collusive behavior una¤ected, it does increase principals' expected payo¤s in the punishment path. When courts are more prone to enforce exclusivity provisions the punishment for deviating softens because principals are more likely to be insulated from competition and reap the rents created by their exclusive stars. For e large enough, the reward for cheating on the agreement may therefore outweigh the cost. (Perfect enforceability provides the lowest punishment, i.e. zero punishment, because the star is tied to the principal till the end of the period.) The fact that the expected losses associated with the punishment phase are decreasing in probability with which courts enforce exclusionary rights over stars plays a major role in our analysis.
A collusive outcome is sustainable if and only if P i 's short-term gains from deviating are compensated by the subsequent long-term losses, i.e., whenever [use (2.7) and (2.8)]: 9) which is equivalent to e 3 2 = e : (2.10) Expression (2.10) can alternatively be written as ; where = 2= (3 e) is the critical discount factor below which principals are unable to sustain tacit collusion in a repeated-interaction environment. This is depicted in Figure 1 . Since @ =@e > 0; the sustainability of collusive behavior in the market for new stars decreases with e. More particularly, for < 2=3 principals cannot sustain collusive subgame-perfect equilibria irrespective of the value of e: On such occasions the level of enforcement of exclusive contracts plays no role whatsoever. For 2=3, however, principals can sustain collusion if and only if e is relatively small (i.e., e must satisfy 2.10). In consequence, when exclusive employment contracts are more likely to be enforced by courts there exist fewer discount factors for which collusion between principals is sustainable-the set of subgame-perfect equilibria that yield collusion is reduced. Di¤erently put, the ability of principals to sustain collusive outcomes is impaired by heightened enforcement of exclusivity clauses. This idea is summarized in the following proposition. ; 1], however, a collusive outcome can be sustained i¤ the probability of enforcement satis…es the condition e 3 2 .
The above result has intriguing distributional implications. To see this, suppose that 2 [ 2 3 ; 1): Then, whenever an increase in e upsets the implicit understanding between principals it also boosts the equilibrium rewards earned by stars. This is because after switching to the non-collusive equilibrium path stars earn competitive salaries whenever they are free, while in the collusive path star always get their reservation utility w 0 : We deal with distributional e¤ects more thoroughly in Section 3, where some stars might earn wages above w 0 even along the equilibrium collusive path.
It is easy to see that in the presence of costless contracting, colluding principals lose nothing by always writing exclusive clauses with their agents. However, in the presence of positive but negligible transaction costs colluding principals would never write exclusive contracts. Clearly this bang-bang prediction is not very realistic. We shall come back to this issue in Section 5, where an enriched version of our basic model does permit us to study when and why costly exclusive employment contracts are signed.
Welfare Implications
Above we argued that the degree of enforcement of exclusive employment contracts (or non-compete clauses) may a¤ect principals' ability to sustain non-competitive behavior in the "market for new talent". Yet the Relationship between e and critical discount factor. mechanism highlighted there was neutral in terms of aggregate welfare because principals merely collude in order to maintain stars'rewards relatively low. In such a context, increases in e may only induce distributional shifts. This need not always be the case though. In this subsection we extend the basic framework by introducing other markets, and show that our framework entails e¢ ciency implications whenever less collusive behavior in the market for talent leads to pro-competitive conduct in other, not necessarily linked, markets in which principals operate. On such occasions, tighter enforcement of exclusivity deals with potential stars enhances allocative e¢ ciency and bene…ts society as a whole. The analytical vehicle we rely upon for doing this exercise is the concept of multimarket contact pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) .
The main result is simple. When principals cannot maintain collusive outcomes in other markets in which they participate unless they simultaneously sustain non-competitive behavior in the market for new talent, breaking down collusion in the latter market automatically induces competitive behavior in all markets. If the shift of regime in turn raises social welfare in any of those other markets (maybe because joint monopoly pricing can no longer be sustained in a subgame-perfect equilibrium), then stricter enforcement of exclusive employment agreements turns out to be e¢ ciency-enhancing.
To formalize this intuition, suppose principals P 1 and P 2 operate (i.e. interact) in two separate markets, A and B. Following Bernheim and Whinston (1990), we assume the markets are technologically independent.
The interaction between principals occurs at the same set of points in discrete time, f g 1 =0 : P i 's static payo¤ function in market j is denoted by ij (s ij ; s ij ), where s ij is the strategy chosen by P i in market j. 17 To keep things simple, assume the punishment phase in market j yields the same discounted payo¤ j to both principals in the next period, and restrict attention to stationary equilibrium paths. As shown in the previous section, generally A (e) will be increasing in the level of contract enforcement e (see 2.8). So we just posit that @ A (e)=@e > 0.
When principals treat the two markets in isolation, strategies (s 1j ; s 2j ) constitute a perfect equilibrium outcome path in market j if and only if
for i 2 f1; 2g, whereŝ ij (s ij ) is P i 's static best response to s ij (see Bernheim and Whinston (1990) ). This is the analogue of condition (2.9). Next, suppose that (2.11) holds strictly for j = A but does not hold for
These inequalities imply that if principals treat the two markets unconnectedly, collusive strategies (s 1j ; s 2j )
are supportable as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in market A (the market for new talent) but not in market
As it turns out, principals could do better by "pooling" the incentive constraints in order to sustain collusive outcomes in the two markets. Recognizing their multimarket contact, they could agree that any deviation in either market will be met with future punishments in both markets. 18 In this context, strategies
are supportable as a perfect equilibrium (collusive) outcome if
As noted by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) , this pooling device may be a method of relaxing binding constraints so as to increase principals'expected pro…ts. In the case being considered here, non-competitive behavior in market A is essential to sustain collusive outcomes in market B because only the former constraint was assumed to be slack. Di¤erently put, principals can use their slack enforcement power in the market for new talent to overcome incentive problems in market B: Our point is that higher enforceability of exclusive employment agreements might in fact break down collusion in "both" markets. To see this suppose, for example, there exists e such that
In these circumstances, (2.12) fails to hold for any e e: Our comparative statics thus indicate that when e increases, …rms' ability to punish in market A decreases. The novelty here is that the sustainability of more global collusive arrangements involving other markets may also collapse. Hence, when e rises aggregate welfare goes up whenever the breakdown of collusion in those other markets has positive welfare implications.
Monetary Transfers at the Contracting Stage
The above analysis rests on the assumption that agents are unable to make up-front payments to principals because they are liquidity constrained. While this is an appropriate assumption if, for example, agents lack initial wealth and cannot borrow against (potential) talent, it evidently poses a rent-extraction problem for principals. This is because in the absence of collusion, non-exclusive stars reap some of the rents created in the market. In e¤ect principals provide agents with a chance to become valuable merchandise but are unable to "charge" for this service at the outset. When monetary transfers from agents to principals at the contracting stage are possible, principals can appropriate more of the expected surplus created in the market through a suitable (signing-up) fee paid up front. That way rent-extraction problems disappear.
Under these conditions, collusion becomes unattainable independently of the probability of enforcement e.
Indeed, in all likelihood principals will not be bothered about writing exclusive contracts with their potential stars. This is because a principal can reap in expected terms exactly the same rents with an up-front entry fee as with an exclusive employment contract. As a result, the gains from collusive behavior evaporate and exclusivity does not impinge on the principals'inability to sustain collusion.
This "irrelevance" result is formally summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If A can pay P i an up-front monetary transfer at the contracting stage, then the probability of enforcement e does not a¤ ect sustainability of collusion. Further, in this case collusion does not boost the principals' equilibrium payo¤ s.
Asymmetric Star-Breeding Technologies
In this section we brie ‡y consider the case in which principals have distinct probabilities of breeding superstars. Perhaps the available resources to spend searching and forming potential stars vary across principals, with the result that one of them creates celebrities more frequently than the other. Be that as it may, we posit that P i breeds the star with probability i whereas P i does it with probability 1 i ; where i 2 [0; 1].
The chief di¤erence between this scenario and the symmetric one considered above is given by the principal's discounted payo¤s under collusion and non-collusion. Here the present value of P i 's expected
After any defection, the discounted payo¤ to P i is in turn given by
In consequence, the principals'loss as a result of deviation from a collusive behavior amounts to
Since the gains from cheating when the star is free talent in the market are again captured by (2.8), principals can sustain collusion as a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if
This expression con…rms our previous conclusion that as e rises, non-competitive behavior in the market for stars is more di¢ cult to sustain. Further, very asymmetric principals also …nd it relatively more di¢ cult to sustain collusive equilibria because the term minf i ; 1 i g becomes smaller-the enforcement level e for which collusion is sustainable is lower. Formally; Proposition 3 When the asymmetry between principals'star-breeding technologies increases, collusive agreements are more di¢ cult to sustain. Speci…cally, the minimum enforcement level below which collusion can be sustained as a SPE decreases with i 1 2 .
This conclusion is in line with prior literature on tacit collusion: more asymmetry between …rms makes implicit collusion less sustainable. The underlying rationale for our result is somewhat di¤erent though.
E¤ectively, in most of the existing literature the mechanism at work is that a larger …rm has more to gain from a deviation and cannot be punished so severely by the smaller ones. Hence more asymmetry is procompetitive because the dominant …rm's incentive to defect on the agreement swells [see, e.g., Compte et al. (2002) ]. Here, however, it is the weakest principal who …nds defection relatively more attractive. As this principal faces a dismal prospect of breeding its own stars in the future, the immediate gains from a defection in the current period outweigh the longer-term losses. A related result arises in the Industrial Organization literature. With di¤erent unit costs and no side payments, joint pro…t maximization might entail zero production by the less e¢ cient …rm which is thus better o¤ deviating [see, e.g., Feuerstein (2005) ].
Again, more asymmetry restricts the ability of …rms to tacitly collude.
In this section we consider a richer setting in which stars embody a quality index. This permits us to take a …rst step towards explaining why principals write costly exclusive employment contracts even when they can sustain collusion in the hiring process.
Concretely, the star's innate talent or productivity is captured by the random variable~ 2 [ ; ]; 0 < < , with continuous distribution function F (:) (density f (:)) on its support. Each period, denotes the realized state of nature. For now, we shall assume that is observed by all parties together with the identity of the new star-one case of asymmetric information is considered in Section 3.2.
i ( ); i 2 f1; 2g ; represents the (gross) revenue created by a type star who works for P i . Hence principals may value talent di¤erently. We posit that i ( ) is increasing and continuous, and that i ( ) > w 0 for i = f1; 2g. As in previous sections, the principal who hires a standard agent collects zero. Hence "agent"
can formally be treated as an individual for whom = 0; with the associated payo¤ to the principal
We allow for transfers of talent between principals that lead to ex post e¢ ciency. So, if the star is allocated to a low-value principal after the "contract enforcement and competition for talent" stage (either because the principal is the recepient of exclusivity or because he "won"the star at the competition stage), principals may implement side payments so as to exchange the star and achieve a mutually bene…cial outcome. It is assumed that a …xed, exogenously given share i of the surplus from Pareto-improving transfers goes to P i . 19 As in previous sections, we start the analysis of sustainable collusive outcomes by examining the static equilibrium of the one-shot game. 20 Suppose …rst that P i holds exclusive rights over the star in realization 1 9 Implicit in our analysis is the supposition that only principals collect shares of the renegotiation surplus. Our results do not hinge on this stark assumption, though, and the e¤ect on the analysis of relaxing this simplicity of bilateral bargaining is discussed in the Appendix. 2 0 As in Section 2, principals use their privileged position at the contracting stage. So they will both make the most pro…table wage o¤ers and sign non-compete agreements (i.e. exclusive contracts) with their agents. Therefore, equilibrium contracts in the one-shot game (and consequently along the punishment phase) are given by i = (w 0 ; exclusive), i 2 f1; 2g. The exclusive contracts that we consider can be interpreted as contracts whose fee to break the exclusivity clause is in…nite. So, it is never optimal to a principal to break that clause and hire a star that is exclusive to the other principal. In the spirit of Aghion and Bolton (1987), we could consider contracts that explicitly specify the (…nite) fee associated with a break of the exclusivity clause. In principle, such fee could be used by a contracting principal to extract surplus from a principal with superior valuation for the star. However, in a model like ours in which principals always renegotiate ine¢ cient outcomes, an exclusive contract specifying a …nite penalty fee is never superior (in terms of surplus extraction) to an exclusive contract with an in…nite fee.
This is because, a principal with the highest star valuation facing a star tied to the other principal by an exclusive contract specifying a fee that he considers excessively high, can always reject to pay the fee and consequently not hire the star. By doing so, he forces the other principal into renegotiation, in which case he obtains the same as if the star's exclusive contract had an in…nite fee.
. In this case, principals'payo¤s are given by
and
where superscript "E" means enforceable exclusivity. The logic behind (3.1)-(3.2) is as follows. P i and P i collect their default-option payo¤s, i ( ) w 0 and 0 respectively, plus a fraction of any surplus from renegotiation. For P i is contractually prevented from poaching P i 's star. Underlying the di¤erence between (2.1)-(2.2) and (3.1)-(3.2) is the supposition that the principal who holds exclusive rights over new talent may agree to transfer the star to its (superior) competitor whenever this action is e¢ ciency-enhancing.
Suppose now that P i 's star is free in the market. The maximum wage P i is willing to pay to the star in realization , w i ( ), leaves the principal indi¤erent between wining and losing the star to his rival. Hence w i ( ) must satisfy the following condition:
E¤ectively when P i hires the star he gets i ( ) w i ( ) plus a fraction of the renegotiation surplus, if any.
When P i loses the star to his rival, he gets a positive payo¤ only when i ( )
Since i + i = 1, it follows that w i ( ) = w i ( ), i.e., the maximum rewards that P i and P i are willing to o¤er to the free star are identical. Therefore, in the absence of collusion there is a unique equilibrium of the bidding game in which both principals' o¤er the maximum wage and their payo¤s are given by the r.h.s. of (3.3). Namely;
We denote by w N C ( ) the equilibrium non-collusive wage of a free star of quality , where w N C ( ) = 1 2 ( ) + 2 1 ( ) is increasing in . 22 By looking at (3.4), we can infer that the payo¤ to the highestvalue principal is strictly positive only when he has some bargaining power. So a principal who not only has relatively high bargaining power but is much more productive than his competitor will manage to appropriate most of the surplus created by free stars in the market. 2 1 Notice that if i = 1 if i i and i = 0 otherwise, we obtain a standard Bertrand-type equilibrium outcome in which the winning principal pays a salary equal to the value of the other principal.
2 2 The star's highest salary thus occurs when the principals are identical or the most e¢ cient one has no bargaining power.
The star's lowest salary occurs when the bargaining power of the most e¢ cient principal equals one-her reward is given by the other principal's valuation. Finally, when i = i = 0:5 the star's reward locates halfway between the values of the two principals.
Thus the discounted payo¤ stream from the punishment path amounts to
Principals always capture their respective shares of the surplus from renegotiation. In addition, a principal expects to appropriate the di¤erence between the non-collusive wage and the reservation wage whenever he breeds an exclusive star (which occurs with probability e=2).
Next, let us compute the expected discounted value of principals'pro…ts along a collusive path. To this end, we extend the notion of collusion to encompass situations in which principals tacitly agree on an upper bound to the salaries o¤ered to free stars. More speci…cally, a collusive agreement is de…ned by a schedule w C ( ) that speci…es the maximum wage w C ( ) that principals can o¤er to a type free star. Throughout the following analysis, we refer to this wage as the cooperation wage and to w C ( ) as the cooperation wage schedule. A deviation from an agreement with cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) occurs whenever a principal o¤ers a wage bigger than w C ( ) to a type star that is free. 23 We thus allow for on-equilibrium realizations in which w C ( ) > w 0 . This is a generalization of the type of collusive agreement studied in Section 2 because it enables principals to sustain (some) wage cooperation when coordination on the lowest possible wage, w 0 ;
is not sustainable. 24 Finally, note that in a collusive equilibrium path in which principals tacitly coordinate on wage schedule w C ( ), equilibrium bids for a type free star equal w C ( ) w 0 -the wage prescribed by w C ( ). (We assume that whenever a star receives identical o¤ers from both principals, she accepts the one made by her current employer.)
When P i 's agent becomes a type free star and principals cooperate on the wage schedule w C ( ), their equilibrium payo¤s are given by
2 3 A similar form of collusive agreement is used in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). 2 4 Note that this type of collusion comprises, as special cases, situations in which principals never try to hire each other's stars and fully competitive outcomes. The former occur when coordination focuses on the wage schedule w C ( ) = w 0 for all 2 [ ; ], whereas the latter occur when w C ( ) = w N C ( ) for all 2 [ ; ].
We did not consider explicitly this more general form of collusion in Section 2. We considered only collusive outcomes with cooperation wage w 0 . This was without loss of generality because with homogeneous stars, a collusive outcome with cooperation wage w C w 0 is sustainable if and only if it is with cooperation wage w 0 . Further, by focusing on equilibria with cooperation wage w 0 we focused on the most pro…table equilibria to principals. As we shall see, this is not the case when stars are heterogeneous in terms of talent.
Hence P i gets exactly what it would have obtained had principals abstained from colluding (compare (3.4) with (3.7)). P i gets, in addition to that, the di¤erence between the star's competitive wage and the collusion wage, i.e.,
When P i 's star is exclusive, however, the principals'ability to collude is irrelevant and their payo¤s are
given by E i ( ) [as given by (3.1)-(3.
2)], i 2 f1; 2g, so long as P i 'initial contract with the star speci…es wage w 0 .
Unlike in Section 2, enforcement of exclusive contracts is important even along the collusive path. For in any equilibrium outcome with cooperation wage w C ( ) > w 0 , principals are better o¤ when exclusivity is enforced because on such occasions the recipient of exclusivity also appropriates w C ( ) w 0 . Thus, as long as e > 0, principals are better o¤ signing exclusive employment agreements with their agents (despite non-negligible transaction costs). In the analysis that follows we shall focus on the most pro…table collusive equilibrium to principals. We thus focus on collusive equilibria in which principals sign (on-the-equilibrium path) the most favorable contract to them, i.e., equilibria in which i = (w 0 ; exclusive), i 2 f1; 2g.
The above analysis implies that the principals'(symmetric) expected discounted payo¤s when they can sustain collusion in a subgame-perfect equilibrium path equal
The intuition is as follows. A principal expects to always collect the …rst term in the curly brackets of (3.8) irrespective of whether he initially contracted with the star or not. The second term represents the additional expected payo¤ that accrues to a colluding principal when its agent becomes a star, whereas the third term captures the extra payo¤ to a colluding principal that employs an exclusive star. Notice that in terms of expected aggregate payo¤s to principals, collusion is equivalent to enforceable exclusivity only if the cooperation wage equals w 0 .
Consider now the net gains from cheating on the collusive agreement. Particularly, suppose P i o¤ers w > w C ( ) to P i 's type star when the latter is free in the market. Since P i makes the best wage o¤er (that is acceptable to the star) and gets i ( ) plus a fraction of any renegotiation surplus, the maximum "net" gains from cheating on the tacit understanding are
This expression in fact boils down to
As a result, in realization principals can sustain collusion along a perfect equilibrium path with cooperation wages w C ( ) so long as For expositional reasons, we state this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Collusive outcomes (with contracts i = (w 0 ; exclusive); i = 1; 2; and) with cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) can be sustained in a subgame-perfect equilibrium path if and only if
Proof. See Appendix.
The following proposition generalizes the main conclusion of Section 2 by showing that the ability of principals to sustain collusive outcomes is impaired when law courts are more likely to enforce exclusive employment contracts.
Proposition 4
The set of collusive equilibria (with contracts i = (w 0 ; exclusive); i = 1; 2) is "nonincreasing" in the level of enforcement, e. More speci…cally;
1. If a non-competitive equilibrium with cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) is sustainable when e = b e, then it is also sustainable if e b e.
2. For every non-competitive equilibrium with cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) that is sustainable when e = 0, there exists a level of enforcement e (w( )) such that collusion with cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) is not sustainable for e > e (w C ( )).
Proof. Point 1. follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that the r.h.s. of (3.11) is decreasing with e. Point 2. follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that the r.h.s. of (3.11) is decreasing with e and converges to 0 as e approaches 1.
We next investigate how the level of enforcement of exclusivity a¤ects stars' equilibrium wages and principals' expected payo¤s. This allows us to revisit distributional issues in a more realistic context. To undertake such a comparative-static analysis, we focus on the most pro…table outcomes that principals can sustain in a collusive equilibrium path. In this respect, we de…ne the "most pro…table collusive equilibrium" as one in which principals tacitly agree to o¤er free stars the lowest sustainable wage w C ( ) w 0 for each type star. 25 2 5 This de…nition implies that in the most pro…table equilibrium principals' expected payo¤s are the highest among the payo¤s in all possible collusive equilibria, but it is slightly stronger than that. For it also entails the existence of a well-de…ned cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) in the most pro…table equilibrium.
As a starting point, let us characterize cooperation wages in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium that principals can sustain.
Lemma 2
The cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) associated with the most pro…table collusive equilibrium may be characterized as follows:
for some and K such that w N C ( ) K > w 0 for all 2 max f ; g ; .
Moreover, if e < e = 3 2 the most pro…table collusive equilibrium exists and is such that 2 ( ; ]
The argument behind Lemma 2 is simple. In the most pro…table collusive path, principals pay free stars the lowest wage packet for which the immediate reward for deviating from the agreement is outweighed by the expected discounted value of future punishments. The key feature though is that the gains from cheating covary with the quality of the current star in the market. E¤ectively, in low states of nature the temptation to cheat is relatively small with respect to the expected value of future punishments (which depends on future realizations of~ ). Hence principals can sustain w 0 as a cooperative wage. When principals are faced with a free star of abnormally high quality (a superstar ), however, the gains from deviating rise relative to the present value of future punishments. On such occasions incentive compatibility requires that principals pay non-competitive wages above w 0 . That way, the reward for defecting in the current period shrinks.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that for stars of relatively high ability (i.e. in realizations where > ), the "marginal reward" to ability under the most pro…table collusion equilibrium is identical to that under non-collusion. More speci…cally, whenever > the non-cooperative wage function w N C ( ) di¤ers from the cooperation wage schedule w C ( ) by just a constant.
The result that in some realizations of~ principals may …nd it pro…table to collude on wages above w 0 to diminish the temptation to cheat is reminiscent of Rotermberg and Saloner (1986). In their case, periods of relatively high demand are accompanied by output beyond the joint pro…t-maximizing level so as to reduce the immediate bene…ts reaped by a deviating …rm. This behavior gives rise to the so-called "price wars during booms". 26 Here, however, superbly talented stars who are free in the market earn premium wages because principals attempt to sustain collusive outcomes. Since cooperation between principals never really breaks down, these outcomes are a sort of "cold wars" for talent.
We now move on to analyze how e a¤ects stars' equilibrium wages along the most pro…table collusive equilibrium sustainable by principals. Since Proposition 4 showed that the sustainability of collusion with a given w C ( ) depends on the probability of enforcement, we refer to the cooperative wage schedule and the cuto¤ associated with the most pro…table equilibrium as functions of e: w C ( ; e) and (e), respectively.
The next result then follows. is not sustainable in equilibrium). Then, the cooperation wage w C ( ; e) associated with the most pro…table collusive equilibrium is strictly increasing in e; for each 2 [max f ; (e)g ; ]. Further, if (e) then (e) is strictly decreasing in e.
Proposition 5 establishes that stars'wage packets tend to increase (more speci…cally, do not decrease) as exclusivity is more tightly enforced by courts. This comparative-static result may seem self-evident, since tighter enforcement of non-compete covenants ultimately means that principals have to pay more to hire their agents exclusively. However, the underlying mechanism at work in our model is much more subtle. When the level enforcement of exclusive contracts increases, collusion becomes more di¢ cult to sustain because future punishments on deviants are less severe. In order to sustain optimal collusive equilibria, principals must therefore permit high-ability stars to earn higher wages and content themselves with lower pro…ts.
That way, neither principal …nds it pro…table to deviate from the agreement. Figure 2 illustrates the central messages of Propositions 5 and Lemma 2, where we depict the cooperative wage schedule, w C ( ); as a function of the quality parameter, (we further assume that i ( ) is strictly concave). We consider there a comparative-static exercise for two …xed values of the probability of enforcement, e 0 > 0 and e 00 > e 0 : Note that as e rises, the wage schedule shifts upwards and the cut-o¤ value plummets in order to ful…l condition (3.11). As a result of the increase in e, there are more realizations in which stars are paid "non-competitive"wage packets above w 0 -we stress the word non-competitive because these wages are lower than w N C ( ) :
We can now tackle distributional issues. Particularly, we would like to know what happens to the expected discounted payo¤s to stars and principals after a change in the probability of enforcement, e. In that connection, the fact that free stars of relatively high ability earn higher equilibrium wages when e goes up implies that they may actually gain from tighter enforcement of non-compete clauses. The ‡ip side, of course, is that superstars are less likely to become free. This is analyzed more formally in the next proposition. Proposition 6 Consider a given probability of enforcement of exclusive contracts, e 0 , and suppose that the most pro…table collusive equilibrium is such that (e 0 ) 2 ( ; ). If the probability of enforcement rises to 1 > e 00 > e 0 , we have that:
(i) either (e 00 ) < and stars with ability 2 [ ; (e 0 )] are better o¤ , or (e 00 ) and stars with ability 2 [ ; (e 00 )] earn the same while stars with ability 2 ( (e 00 ); (e 0 )] are better o¤ ;
(ii) either all stars with ability 2 ( (e 0 ); ] are better o¤ , or there exists { 2 ( (e 0 ); ) such that stars with ability 2 ( (e 0 ); {) are better o¤ and stars with ability 2 ({; ] are worse o¤ .
Further, the principals'expected payo¤ s along the most pro…table collusive equilibrium path may decrease with the level of enforcement of exclusivity provisions.
When e rises, there are two opposite forces at work. For one thing, a larger fraction of the expected rents created in the market accrue to the colluding principals because stars are free less often. For another thing, collusion is harder to sustain and in some realizations the coordinated wage schedule w C ( ) increases.
Hence expected rents to the colluding principals falter. The interplay between these two e¤ects ultimately determines whether principals and stars lose or gain from movements in e. To illustrate, consider relatively low realizations of~ . On these occasions principals can a¤ord to pay low wages on the collusive path even when exclusivity is not enforced. Since the marginal loss from decreasing the likelihood of becoming free stars in the market is low, the second e¤ect dominates and stars are better o¤ when enforcement swells.
In relatively high realizations of~ , however, colluding principals need to o¤er premium wages to free stars.
Therefore the marginal loss from being free in the market less often is high and may o¤set the marginal gain from increases in the coordinated wage bill. In this case, the …rst e¤ect dominates and superstars are worse o¤ with heightened enforcement.
A consequence of this is that changes in the enforcement parameter need not have the same impact on the well-being of all stars. Particularly, a shift in the legal environment toward stricter exclusivity enforcement may induce a redistribution of expected surplus from top stars to stars of relatively low ability. There also exists a parallel redistribution of wealth between principals and potential stars. An important implication of Proposition 6 is that an increase in the (probabilistic) enforcement level is not necessarily bad for stars and good for principals. Actually exactly the opposite may be true. This conclusion stems from the impact of stricter enforcement on the most pro…table collusive equilibria that principals can sustain.
Partial Collusion and Star Wars
In this section, we discuss brie ‡y how our results extend to a simpler form of collusion in which, given a state of nature, principals either abstain from hiring each other's star or engage in …erce competition for the new talent. This sort of collusion is appealing because it requires relatively little coordination and/or communication between principals-the prescribed strategies are less delicate. Thus it is easier to implement in practice. The downside, of course, is that principals no longer choose the most pro…table collusive behavior.
Hence there is a basic trade-o¤ between simplicity and pro…tability. While arguably less burdensome as far as strategic coordination is concerned, this scheme raises the average cost of hiring new talent because coordinated behavior coexists with blatant star wars in equilibrium.
Full collusion means principals cooperate in all possible realizations, i.e., they tacitly agree not to poach each other's star irrespective of the latter's ability. When collusive behavior for all 2 [ ; ]) is not sustainable, however, principals might focus on less ambitious outcomes in which coordination only occurs in some realizations of~ . For example principals may adopt non-competitive conduct if and only if 2
where stands for the cooperation set. These outcomes are called perfect equilibria with "partial collusion".
In the presence of partial collusion employers bid for new talent whenever = 2 ; but this competitive behavior is not considered a defection on the tacit agreement. All this leads to …erce competition for superstars because in relatively high realizations of~ ; pro…table deviations cannot be deterred. Stars'equilibrium wages are therefore either w 0 or w N C ( ).
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Consider an equilibrium with partial collusion in which principals behave non-competitively only if 2 .
This situation corresponds to the following cooperative wage schedule:
In consequence, cooperation wages di¤er from competition wages only when the star's ability 2 . The equilibrium sustainability condition of Lemma 1 then becomes
Direct inspection shows that when courts are more prone to enforce exclusive contracts, condition (3.12) is less likely to hold. Indeed Proposition 4 implies that the set of collusive equilibria (partial or total collusion) cannot increase with the level of enforcement, e. In other words, if an equilibrium with partial collusion and cooperation set is sustainable when the e = b e, then it is also sustainable when e b e.
We now focus on the most pro…table collusive equilibrium with partial collusion. Since principals'payo¤s are decreasing in stars' wage packets, the payo¤s to principals on the equilibrium path increase with the cooperation set (where set 1 is said to be larger than set 2 if 2 1 ). Suppose now that a collusive equilibrium with cooperation set 6 = ? exists, and consider an arbitrary 0 2 . Inequality 3.12 is trivially satis…ed for = 0 . Further, since the l.h.s. of 3.12 is increasing in , it must also hold for every 00 < 0 .
This observation, together with the fact that in the presence of partial collusion principals'payo¤s increase with the size of the supportive cooperation set, dictates that in the most pro…table equilibrium principals cooperate whenever sup . 28 Consequently, the cooperation set of the most pro…table equilibrium with partial collusion is of the form [ ; (e)], for some (e) 2 [ ; ]-principals cooperate for stars of relatively low ability but compete …ercely for top quality talent.
The sustainability condition for the most pro…table equilibrium is then given by
for all (e). When the cuto¤ (e) lies inside the set [ ; ], (3.13) has to hold with equality. In such circumstances, an upward shift in the enforcement level from e to e 0 triggers a decrease in the r.h.s. of (3.13) and therefore (e 0 ) < (e).
The aforementioned implies that heightened enforcement of exclusivity provisions leads to more realizations with star wars. Competition for the marginal stars-i.e. those within ( (e 0 ); (e)]-increases, and is di¤erent from the mechanism that generates price wars in Green and Porter (1984) . In Green and Porter (1984) , price wars occur on-the-equilibrium path because of an informational problem: when …rms observe a low market price, they do not know whether that is due to a negative shock in the demand or to a deviation by one of the other …rms. Thus, to make collusion sustainable, a punishment always follows observation of a low market price (even when that is exclusively due to an exogenous demand ‡uctuation). 2 8 The inequality is not strict because the l.h.s. of the inequality in (3.12) is continuous in . Thus, if condition (3.12) is satis…ed then it is also satis…ed for sup .
their expected earnings unambiguously go up. Stars with ability above (e) are clearly worse o¤: their noncollusive wages do not change but they are less likely to become free talent. Stars with ability 2 [ ; (e 0 )] neither lose nor win, and when (e) is su¢ ciently close to principals are worse o¤ after the change.
We summarize the main results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 7
In the most pro…table partial collusive equilibrium outcome, principals avert competition in relatively low states of nature (i.e. stars with ability below (e)) and compete for the superstars (i.e. stars with ability above (e)).
If (e) 2 ( ; ) and courts become more prone to enforce exclusivity, then the superstars are worse o¤ while the stars with ability 2 [ ; (e)] are better o¤ . All other stars are una¤ ected. In addition, there are situations in which principals are worse o¤ after the increase in e.
Realistically, with this milder form of collusion star wars occur even in the equilibrium path. Note also that heightened enforcement of exclusivity leads to a more equitable distribution of rewards across stars: a redistribution of rents takes place from premium talent to stars of lower ability.
Exclusive Superstars, Non-Exclusive Goodish Stars
This section deals with asymmetric information in the context of fully collusive outcomes. In particular, suppose that when principal and agent meet they observe the latter's ability, i , but principals know neither the ability of the agent hired by the his rival nor the identity of the star in the market. As in previous sections, this uncertainty is resolved after the initial contracting stage. Thus, think of as the agent's "potential" which is realized only if she becomes a star.
Consider a collusive (subgame-perfect) equilibrium with cooperation wage schedule w C (:). If P i is matched with a type agent for whom w C ( ) = w 0 , exclusivity is irrelevant because P i anticipates that in equilibrium P i will not poach his star. When matched with a type agent for whom w C ( ) > w 0 , however, the principal proposes exclusivity to the agent. E¤ectively P i knows that if his agent becomes a free star, P i will cooperate only if the wage is greater than or equal to w C ( ). Otherwise P i 's gains from cheating on the agreement and poaching the superstar outweigh the cost. Thus, when faced with uniquely talented individuals, principals are better o¤ proposing exclusive contracts to them.
The above argument is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that principals know the ability of the agents they are matched with and that e > 0.
Then, in the most pro…table collusive equilibrium to principals, a principal is strictly better o¤ proposing an exclusive contract to an agent if and only if the agent's ability > (e).
talented stars earn premium wages when they are free in the market, on these occasions exclusivity enables principals to hold a tighter grip on hiring costs. In the case of less outstanding talent, writing exclusive contracts proves too costly because coordination on w 0 is feasible even when these stars are free in the market.
Another prediction of the above analysis is that exclusive agreements are rampant precisely when courts are more likely to enforce them. While this result seems intuitive, the underlying mechanism at work deserves some attention. Exclusive contracts are more frequently used not because they are necessarily more e¤ective, but because collusive outcomes are harder to sustain and principals fall back on other ways to appropriate the rents created by their stars.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we argue that stricter legal enforcement of exclusive (employment) relationships may hinder collusive behavior among …rms that compete for the procurement of a scant valuable asset (e.g., talent).
This stands in sharp contrast with the commonly held view that exclusivity provisions facilitate collusion (see, e.g., Rey and Stiglitz (1995) ). Thus, in the context of this paper, a stricter enforcement of exclusive employment agreements may promote competition and consequently enhance e¢ ciency. This e¤ect can have repercussions well beyond the speci…c labor/talent market where the exclusive contracts are written -when …rms interact in many markets simultaneously, breaking down collusion in the market for talent may induce competitive behavior in all markets.
Based on the derived relationship between the level of legal enforcement of exclusive contracts and …rms' ability to sustain collusive, we draw a number of implications both for equilibrium (exclusive) contracts and for redistributive e¤ects of changes in the enforcement of exclusivity.
First, we show that when there exists private information at the contracting stage, exclusive contracts will only be written with those superstars that locate at the top end of quality distribution. So, the paper predicts a positive correlation between frequency of exclusive contracts and employee's quality/ability. This prediction is consistent with the fact that we tend to observe more frequently exclusive contracts with highranked workers in …rms (e.g., CEOs and other top managers) than with low ranked employees. Second, we demonstrate in the paper that …rms will rely more heavily on exclusive contracts when those contracts are more likely to be enforced. While this conclusion seems trivial, the underlying mechanism at work is quite subtle: as higher enforcement results in fewer collusive equilibrium outcomes, principals have more Appendix A.1. Agents with bargaining power at the outset
The setting is essentially similar to the one considered in Section 2, but we assume that in any given match principal and agent make take-it-or-leave-it contract o¤ers with probability and 1 ; respectively.
The As always, we begin by examining the competitive equilibrium of the one-shot game in which no collusion occurs. If P i ; i 2 f1; 2g ; has the chance to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the agent, the optimal contract is i = (w 0 ; exclusive) : On the other hand, if the potential star has the chance to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the principal, the optimal contract may be A = (w 0 ; non-exclusive) or that is, w N C = (e + w 0 ) = (1 + e) : Note that every take-it-or-leave-it o¤er leaves the responding party indi¤erent between accepting and not accepting.
Hence, at the beginning of a stage game P i 's expected payo¤ for that period is as follows
In an in…nite-horizon setting in which principals can sustain collusive outcomes, their discounted expected payo¤s along the most pro…table (or the "best") non-competitive equilibrium path is given by
E¤ectively it is as if principals took turns in collecting expected "monopoly"rents, which in turn depend on the distribution of bargaining power. A principal's gain from cheating on the collusive agreement, i.e. the reward for luring the star away from the other principal, is now given by w 3 0 If agents were risk averse, though, they would strictly prefer to o¤er principals exclusive contracts instead of non-exclusive ones. wherew is the minimum wage o¤er that induces the new talent to switch principals. Presently, the optimal wage packet that needs to be o¤ered by a deviating principal can take one out of two possible values
depending on whether the principal or the (non-exclusive) star had a chance to make an o¤er at the contracting stage. In e¤ect principals always o¤er a wage equal to w 0 whereas agents can demand a reward w
It is easy to see that w C > w N C and that the immediate bene…t for the deviating principal, w, is always positive.
From (4:1) and (4:2), we may conclude that P i would "never" deviate from the collusive agreement if
that is, if e < (2 + ) 2 =ẽ:
The critical discount factor = 2= [2 + (1 e)] and its positive relationship with the enforcement level e is depicted in Figure 3 . Evidently, as increases the set of potential values of e for which principals can sustain non-competitive behavior expands. That is, @ẽ=@ > 0: This is because the gain from defection remains the same whereas the discounted value of the future losses goes up (see 4.3). As a result, when increases principals can sustain collusion even with stricter legal enforcement of exclusive contracts. Another way to put it is that as approaches zero, collusive outcomes are impossible to sustain in a subgame-perfect equilibrium because the gains from cheating are bounded away from zero whereas the discounted payo¤s along the collusive path tend to zero. The point we want to make though is that for any > 0, the sustainability of collusive behavior between principals in the market for new talent decreases with e. This is precisely the insight brought into the foreground in Section 2.
A.2. Three-way bargaining ex post
The purpose of this section is to show that the qualitative conclusion of Proposition 1 carries over to a slightly more complicated-albeit perhaps also more realistic-environment in which the star has some bargaining power and can always force a wage renegotiation ex post. To do this, we focus on the case of equally productive principals and stars considered in Section 2, and rely on the three-party bargaining model pioneered by Segal and Whinston (2000) and furthered by Segal (2003) . For notational convenience, we assume throughout that w 0 and the revenue created by a standard agent equal zero.
Segal and Whinston's bargaining solution guarantees e¢ ciency. In addition, player j's ex post payo¤ consists of a non-negatively weighted linear combination of his or her marginal contributions to the di¤erent coalitions that can potentially be formed. So let the constant j represent the weight on player j's marginal contribution to coalition in the player's payo¤ function. 31 Notice that, in our model, all coalitions in which there is only one player and the coalition containing the two principals produce a surplus of zero.
Consider …rst each period of the punishment phase. When P i holds enforceable exclusive rights over the star in the market, the parties'bargaining payo¤s are as follows: The key di¤erence between (4.4) and (4.5) is that in the latter case the members of coalition = fP i ; sg may trade and therefore their payo¤s go up. By the same token, P i 's bargaining payo¤ plummets. Since aggregate payo¤s should always equal the surplus generated by the grand coalition of all players, the parameters j must also satisfy the following adding-up restrictions: : Hence, after a deviation, the discounted stream of payo¤ to P i is thus given by From (4.6) and (4.7), we may compute the expected discounted loss of future pro…ts as a result of cheating on the implicit understanding between principals. These long-term losses amount to The above expression is non-negative and decreasing in e; whereas the short-term gains from deviating are independent of e: Hence the qualitative e¤ect of an increase in the probability of exclusivity enforcement on principals'ability to sustain collusive outcomes is as in Section 2.
Proof. (of Lemma 2) We start by the …rst part of the lemma. Let K denote the value of the punishment associated to a deviation from the most pro…table equilibrium. Because in the most pro…table equilibrium cooperation wages w C ( ) must be the lowest among those that are sustainable, w C ( ) must equal w 0 if is such that w N C ( ) w 0 K and must satisfy w N C ( ) w C ( ) = K if otherwise. The result then follows from letting
(which by continuity of w N C ( ) exists) if otherwise, and using the fact that w N C ( ) is increasing in .
We next focus on the case in which e < e and prove the second part of the lemma. Suppose …rst that
Continuity of F (:) implies that f (:) is atomless, which in turn implies that the r.h.s. of (4.8) is strictly bigger than one. Thus, (4.8) is equivalent to e e 0 , where e 0 < e . Condition (4.8) is also equivalent to condition (3.11) in Lemma 1 when cooperation wages are w C ( ) = w 0 for all 2 ; . Therefore, it implies that a collusive equilibrium with those cooperation wages is sustainable. If an equilibrium with cooperation wages w C ( ) = w 0 for all 2 ; is sustainable, then it is the most pro…table to principals. Thus, in this case, such equilibrium exists and is characterized by a wage schedule satisfying w C ( ) = w 0 for all 2 ; , which in the statement of the Lemma correspond to the case of = .
Suppose now that
i.e., e 0 < e < e . Let Z denote the value of a punishment following a deviation. Take it as exogenous for a moment. Given Z, let b be the maximum talent for which cooperation wage w 0 is sustainable, i.e.,
Given punishment Z, the optimal cooperation wages from the principals'perspective (that are sustainable) are w C ( ) = w 0 if b and w C ( ) = w N C ( ) Z if > b , since these wages are the lowest for which a deviation is not pro…table. Now, given these optimal cooperation wages, we can obtain the value of the punishment, which depends on the cuto¤ b . Speci…cally, Thus, we have a mapping from the space of possible punishments into itself: a given punishment implies an optimal wage schedule de…ned by the cuto¤ obtained from (4.10), which in turn implies a new punishment from (4.11). The …xed points of this mapping correspond to collusive equilibria of our game. The …xed point with the highest Z corresponds to the most pro…table collusive equilibrium. We now show that a …xed point exists. Speci…cally, we show that exists a b 2 ( ; ) for which (4.10) and (4.11) hold. De…ne
. We need to show that exists a 0 2 ( ; ) such that h( 0 ) = 0. Using (4.11),
we obtain that h( ) = [w N C ( ) w 0 ] 1 1 2 1
(1 e) .
The expression in square brackets is positive, since w N C ( ) = 1 2 ( ) + 2 1 ( ) and i ( ) > w 0 , i 2 f1; 2g.
By the …rst inequality in (4.9), the expression in the curved brackets is negative. Therefore h( ) < 0. In a similar way, we obtain that
which by the second inequality in (4.9) is positive. Since h( ) is negative, h( ) is positive and h( ) is continuous, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that exist 0 2 ( ; ) such that h( 0 ) = 0.
Moreover, from continuity of h( ) and the fact that h( ) is positive, it follows that the set f 0 2 ( ; ) :
h( 0 ) = 0g, which is nonempty, has a maximum. Since Z ( ) is increasing, this maximum corresponds to the most pro…table collusive equilibrium. Let Consider …rst an arbitrary 0 2 max f ; (e)g ; . From Lemma 2, it follows that w C ( 0 ; e) > w 0 . Since in the most pro…table equilibrium, principals pay to a free agent the lowest wage for which a deviation is not pro…table, then (3.10) must hold with equality for = 0 , i.e., w N C ( 0 ) w C ( 0 ; e) = 1 1 2 (1 e)E w N C ( ) w C ( ; e) . (4.12) Note that, given enforcement level e, the r.h.s. of (4.12) is the maximum of the r.h.s. of (3.10) within the set of cooperation wage schedules w C ( ) that are sustainable in a collusive equilibrium. This is because the r.h.s. of (3.10) corresponds to the di¤erence between a principal's discounted payo¤ along the collusive path and along the punishment phase and the latter does not depend on cooperation wages. We can then conclude that among all the wage schedules w C ( ) sustainable in a collusive equilibrium when enforcement level is e, E w N C ( ) w C ( ) is maximal when w C ( ) = w C ( ; e). From this and from the fact that the set of collusive equilibria is non-increasing in e (established in Proposition 4), it follows that for e 0 > e E w N C ( ) w C ( ; e 0 ) E w N C ( ) w C ( ; e) , which implies that Consider now the case in which 0 = max f ; (e)g. If > (e), then the proof is identical to when 0 2 max f ; (e)g ; . If (e), then by Lemma 2 w C ( (e); e) = w 0 . Since (e) < , optimality of cooperation wage schedule w C ( ; e) implies that w N C ( (e)) w 0 = 1 1 2 (1 e)E w N C ( ) w C ( ; e) : (4.14)
(4.14) together with (4.13) (which also holds in this case) imply two things. First, they imply that w C ( (e); e 0 ) > w C ( (e); e), which concludes the proof that w C ( ; e) is strictly increasing in e for each 2 [max f ; (e)g ; ]. Second, they imply that (e 0 ) < (e) because w N C ( ) is a increasing function of , which establishes that (e) is decreasing in e. This concludes the proof. Finally, to observe that there are cases in which principals'expected payo¤s lower when the enforcement level increases, suppose e is such that (e) is smaller than but su¢ ciently close to it. If e increases, stars with ability > (e) are better o¤ while stars with ability (e) are either better o¤ or remain the same. Thus, since some types of stars are better o¤ and no type of star is worse o¤, the principals'expected payo¤s across stars'types must decrease.
Proof. (of Proposition 6) Let

